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**CASTE AND PRODUCTION RELATIONS IN INDIA'S INFORMAL ECONOMY: A GRAMSCIAN  
ANALYSIS**

### **Abstract**

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After the introduction, Section 2 introduces Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony in civil society. Section 3 relies on the evidence and argument provided by the literature on contemporary India with the aim of pointing out the two-fold role of caste as an institution and as an ideology. Section 4 summarises the results of a survey of Arni's civil society, which explores the economic impact of social organisation. Section 5 comments on the role of caste in Arni's civil society.

### **Key words**

**India**

**Caste**

**Civil society**

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CASTE AND PRODUCTION RELATIONS IN INDIA'S INFORMAL ECONOMY:

A GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS<sup>1</sup>

by

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## 1. Introduction

This paper explores the impact of caste on production relations in contemporary India. Despite the formal abolition of caste discrimination in Indian Constitution, caste continues to represent a major organising principle of India's capitalism: a secularised institution which has acquired new roles in the economy, society and polity following the Mandal Report and the implementation of the Reservation Policy for backward castes and classes.

Caste is analysed here by means of conceptual categories borrowed from Gramsci's theory of hegemony. Partially overcoming the conventional Marxist view of caste as a 'false consciousness', caste is conceptualised as an *institution* and an *ideology*, which influences mental processes and social intercourse and, at the same time, defines widely accepted patterns of civil society organisation.

The impact of caste on social production relations is empirically explored in the case of Arni, a rural market town in South India, which has experienced a major socio-economic transformation after the Green revolution. The analysis focuses on the forms of civil society's organisation, which, as Gramsci shows, is an outcome of the interplay of particularistic interests.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony in civil society. Section 3 relies on the evidence and argument provided by the literature on contemporary India with the aim of pointing out the two-fold role of caste as an institution and as an ideology. Section 4 summarises the results of a survey of Arni's civil society, which explores the economic impact of social organisation. Section 5 comments on the role of caste in Arni's civil society.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper summarises the theoretical and empirical analysis of caste presented in my book *Capitalist Development in India's informal economy* (Routledge, 2013).

## 2. Gramsci's theory of hegemony in civil society

The political thought of Antonio Gramsci plays a key role in the development of historical materialism in the XX century. Challenging Marx's view that structure has a primacy over superstructure, Gramsci argues that history is not moved by historical laws exclusively rooted in production relations. By means of an innovative analysis of the relations between structure and superstructure, he shows that the ideas and concepts leading human agency are an outcome of social relations and exert a key impact on economic organisation.

This innovative view of the relations of structure and superstructure is contained in Gramsci's theory of hegemony in civil society. This paper begins with a review of the main concepts of this theory which provides the conceptual framework for my analysis of the impact of caste on production relations in contemporary India.

### *Civil society*

In *Quaderni del carcere*, Gramsci presents a view of civil society that markedly differs from Marx's. Following Hegel, Gramsci focuses on the *association* as the 'constituent element' of civil society (Gramsci, 1975: 703) and identifies the key aim of associations in the representation and administration of private interests<sup>2</sup>. Yet, Gramsci's view differs also from Hegel's. For Gramsci, the private interests represented and administrated in civil society do not belong only to the economic sphere, as for Hegel, while associations are an outcome of both economic and non-economic interests and ideas. Then, Gramsci's civil society contains relations and institutions which emerge from social intercourse in all spheres of human life.

For Gramsci, civil society is distinct from the state and, with the state, is located within the superstructure.<sup>3</sup> Here is a major discrepancy with Marx's theory in which the state is located within the structure (Bobbio, 1979). The two 'superstructural layers' which constitute the superstructure differ for the way in which class relations are regulated and class conflicts are handled. Gramsci explains this difference by means of the concept of hegemony (Texier, 1979).

### *Hegemony*

The concept of *hegemony*, which Gramsci introduces to analyse the difference in social regulation in the two 'superstructural layers', refers to an original idea of dominance (distinct from state dominance) that is specific to civil society. For Gramsci (as for Marx), the power of the ruling classes in the capitalist economy has an economic basis, which is found in the control of the means of productions. Yet, for Gramsci, the dominance of the ruling classes over the subordinated classes takes economic and non-economic aspects, as it includes also forms of political, moral and intellectual leadership. Gramsci calls this complex form of dominance hegemony and refers to the ruling classes as *hegemonic classes* and to the dominated classes as *subaltern classes*.

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<sup>2</sup> Associations are 'the private texture of the state' (Gramsci, 1975: 57).

<sup>3</sup> 'We can for the moment fix two major superstructural layers: the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State"' (Gramsci, 1975: 1518).

The hegemonic classes keep their leadership over subaltern classes by means of *ideology*: a system of beliefs, values and symbols that are expressions of particularistic interests. Ideology is a tool to ensure the ‘spontaneous’ consensus of the subaltern classes on the power of the hegemonic classes. As Gramsci explains, the “‘spontaneous’ consensus given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group ..... is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production’ (Gramsci, 1975: p. 1519).

Usually, ideology makes the use of coercion unnecessary. However, coercion is not always excluded; moreover, the hegemony of the elites may also require the use of corruption and fraud – which stand ‘in between consensus and force’. This occurs when the exercise of cultural and moral leaderships is difficult and the use of force dangerous (Gramsci, 1975: 1638).

The concept of hegemony provides Gramsci with the key to explore the ways in which class relations are handled in the ‘superstructural layers’ of the capitalist economy, i.e. the state and civil society:

The two layers correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ that the dominant group exercises throughout society, and on the other hand to that of ‘direct dominance’ or rule exercised through the State and the juridical government (Gramsci, 1975: 1518-19).

It follows that, while the state is the realm of force, civil society is the realm of ideology.

### *Hegemony and Ideology*

The construction of hegemony by means of ideology is a complex process. The construction of consensus requires the assimilation of the moral beliefs and values of the hegemonic classes by subaltern classes. It is a sort of ‘pedagogical’ process in which subaltern classes are led throughout by the hegemonic elites (Gramsci, 1975: 1331). It is also a process of negotiation and re-negotiation, in which hegemonic classes take into account the needs of minority groups and combine them with their own interests. The merging of interests is carried out by building a network of alliances between subaltern and hegemonic classes that take the form of ‘voluntary’ associations (i.e. associations in which each individual enters on a ‘voluntary’ basis) that represent the institutional framework of civil society.

The ideology ensures the ‘voluntary’ nature of associations providing the hegemonic classes with the means to gain the ‘spontaneous’ consensus of the subaltern classes to enter the groups in which the alliances with hegemonic classes take their shape.

The associations in which civil society materialises are the outcome of particularistic interests that are imposed on society by means of ideology: they are historical constructions and their life is univocally determined by the nature of the underlying interests. Moreover, there is an essential complementarity between State and civil society: both are the outcome of specific production relations and represent the interests of the dominant classes; and both requires a process of negotiation over conflicting interests.

### *Historical bloc*

Arguing that ideologies often are more powerful than material forces, Gramsci introduces the concept of the 'historical bloc' to emphasise that the distinction between material forces (structure) and ideology (superstructure) has a mere 'didactic' significance. In the concept of historical bloc he includes material forces and ideology, stressing that material forces are the 'content' and ideology is the 'form', and that content and form cannot be taken separately (1975: 869; see also 1051). Gramsci also stresses that in each historical moment there is only one historical bloc being composed by a specific structure (material forces) and a specific 'ideological system' that is consistent with (and expression of) the structure (1975: 1051). There is then a sort of 'necessary reciprocity' between the structure and the superstructures (1975: 1052). Ideology is then an 'expression of the structure' and changes with it and, at the same time, exerts an influence on it (1975: 1413). With the concept of historical bloc Gramsci unifies structure and superstructure (Althusser, 1970: 51).

### *Corporatism*

As 'association of associations' which represent and administer particularistic interests, Gramsci's civil society appears to be an 'institutional structure' largely consistent with the conceptualisation of corporatism (Schmitter, 1974)<sup>4</sup>. In contrast with the abstract ideal of pluralism<sup>5</sup>, in the civil society described by Gramsci interest representation is organised by means of a limited number of associations which have the nature of interest groups, representing particularistic interests and regulating social relations at all levels – including the relations among groups and between groups and the state.

For this conceptualisation, Gramsci's main empirical reference is Fascist Italy, which provided a paradigmatic example of the relations between hegemony and ideology in civil society. In Italian corporatism the institutional structure of organised interests was imposed by the state<sup>6</sup> and rested on three pillars: the Fascist party, the trade unions and the guilds (*corporazioni*). Workers' participation in the guilds was compulsory with the aim to de-legitimate class struggle by means of a forced involvement of workers into the government of the economy. The ideological basis for Fascist corporatist society was an *ad hoc* economic theory based on the concept of *Homo Corporativus*, according to which there were no divergences or contrasts between individual and social interests.

The associations acted as intermediaries, assuming regulatory functions. The relationships between state and the associations were based on tripartite political

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<sup>4</sup> 'Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituents units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.' (Schmitter, 1974: p. 93-94).

<sup>5</sup> 'Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituents units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to the type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognised, subsidized, created, otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.' (Schmitter, 1974: p. 96).

<sup>6</sup> It was then a form of *state corporatism*, a situation which differs from *societal corporatism*, i.e. when the pressure for interest representation and organisation in association emerges from society (Cawson, 1985).

exchange, involving, together with the state, also capital and labour. The use of coercion was not always necessary, being, in principle, substituted by the use of ideological mechanisms that denied the relevance of class and particularistic interests in favour of 'general' cross-class interests.

The ideology of *Homo Corporativus* supported the corporatist project, presenting it as a 'third way', alternative to capitalism and to socialism, leading to the 'modernisation' of the country in the fight against rent and other parasitic burdens.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Caste as an institution and an ideology

In this section I present the hypothesis on the nature of caste in contemporary India that will be empirically explored in section 4. For the formulation of this hypothesis I rely on the literature, which I review with the aim of conceptualising the role of caste in independent India. Gramsci's concepts introduced in section 2 provide the theoretical background for this review.

#### *Caste in independent India*

Caste is a form of social stratification based on a concept of inequality that finds its legitimacy in Hindu religion and culture. It defines a *closed* and *segmented* system of stratification in which individual mobility is denied and caste groups recognise the hierarchy and accept their position in it by force of religious legitimacy.

Caste is analysed both as a form of social stratification and as an ideology. Focusing on the first aspect, a major contribution to the analysis of caste comes from the work of the late M.N. Srinivas (1996) who takes the social order of caste as the origin of power structures and relations influencing economy and polity. Focusing on ideological aspects, it is very influential the classical Marxist analysis which takes caste as a 'false consciousness' (Shah, 2002).<sup>8</sup>

For several decades after the formal abolition of caste discrimination in the Indian Constitution, caste is a non-issue. In academic and political circles the dominant view is that the 'modernisation' of the country would lead to the dissolution of caste, so supporting the democratic transition of the country. Yet, the Mandal Commission and the subsequent Mandal Report imprint a different direction to Indian history and, since the early 1980s, caste is re-invented as a 'modern institution' (Deshpande, 2003: 124).<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to note that the corporatist ideology was not enough to hide the real aims of Italian corporatism to important analysts of the period, who saw it as a 'machine to preserve the existent' (Gramsci: 1975: 125) and as a 'method of consolidating the basis of capitalism' when the conflict between capital and labour had reached a 'critical point' (Sraffa, 1926: 16).

<sup>8</sup> An alternative Marxist view of caste also exists which sees caste as the form taken by class in India (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg, 2003: 114-115).

<sup>9</sup> The Mandal Commission was set up in 1979 in order to actuate the constitutional provisions for reservation: a 'package of protective, preferential and developmental practices' in favour of the less advanced groups of Indian society. The Mandal Report was submitted in December 1980, suggesting a number of reservation measures for the backward and most-backward castes and classes, including Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Tribes (STs) – the communities outside the Hindu caste system, which have

The Mandal Report – and in particular the implementation of the measures for the backward and most backward castes included in the Reservation Policy – induces a process of institutional change that leads, on the one hand, to the secularisation of caste and, on the other, to the emergence of new economic and political roles for it. This change is the outcome of several intertwined processes.

The territorial dispersal of caste members following urban/rural and international migrations leads to the breaking of the boundaries of sub-castes, giving birth to larger castes. This process is reinforced by *caste mobility* and *in-caste class differentiation* (Sharma, 1994: 7-8). A major by-product is the increasing separation between caste and occupations (Béteille, 2007: 951).

Identity is the tool through which castes face the problem of preserving their unity and their boundaries. Caste identities are socially constructed, and their construction undermines caste hierarchy. Often without the support of textual tradition, caste histories are invented, and qualities and skills of each caste are celebrated (Narayan, 2004a). This process relies on caste ‘rhetoric’, which is elaborated and locally disseminated through caste associations (Michelutti, 2004). While the construction of a ‘suitable’ past for castes is not a new phenomenon, neglected and undervalued practices are re-discovered and enhanced (Michelutti, 2004: 49; Gupta, 2004: xix). So, if the Mandal Report accelerates the death of caste as a system, it also enhances the assertion of caste identity (Shah, 2007) leading to the emergence of caste politics.

The politicisation of caste identity and the use of caste as a vehicle to represent and to organise interests in the party political arena is confirmed a major trait of the post-Mandal era. Following the emergence of new caste interests generated by the Reservation Policy, castes behave as pressure groups, organising interests by means of caste associations and political associations, and even caste-based parties (Harriss-White, 2003: 194-196; Bhanu Mehta, 2004; Narayan, 2004a and 2004b; Michelutti, 2004).

#### *Caste and class*

The role of caste politics as an instrument of democratic politics, in particular for the representation of lower castes, is highly controversial (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Narayan, 2004b; Béteille, 2007; Wankhede, 2008; Desai and Dubey, 2011). In very broad terms, the controversy refers to the nature of caste/class relations and to the influence on them of Reservation Policy.

True, caste and class are different forms of social stratification. However, as caste classifications also rely on the occupational status, caste inequalities have often been analysed in terms of class. Socio-anthropological research has shown that the origin of caste is associated to the production of an economic surplus, being caste a tool ‘to accommodate’ the inequalities generated by the surplus itself and hierarchies of landownership and hierarchies of caste often overlap (Shah, 2002). Also Deshpande (2003: 109-120) shows that caste-divide continues to be manifested in terms of income and wealth, while Vaid (2007) shows that high castes dominate professional, business

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been subject to extensive social disadvantage and discrimination – and the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) – i.e. the lower Hindu castes. The implementation of the measures suggested by the Mandal Report started only in August 1990 (Radhakrishnan, 1996: 203).



and large farming classes.

Moreover, there is large evidence that caste discrimination is a form of ‘forced’ social exclusion which restricts the access to capital, labour, land, education, and other inputs to low-caste individuals, denying rights and preventing the mobility on the class ladder (Thorat and Newman, 2007: 4122). This leads to inefficiency in resource allocation and to the perpetuation of the class subordination of the lower castes, a situation which is particularly manifest in the labour market, as shown by the segregation of lower castes to the low quality/low paid jobs (Madheswaran and Attewell, 2007). Finally, the joint action of class and caste increases the segmentation of informal and rural workers, segregating them to the bottom of Indian labour hierarchy (Harriss-White, 2003; Heyer, 2010; Lerche, 2010; Basile, 2013). The conviction is widespread that in post-Mandal India caste is a tool in the hands of the hegemonic classes, which concurs in creating a favourable environment for the marginalisation and exploitation of the lower castes/classes.

While the conceptual difference between caste and class stratifications cannot be denied, caste and class intertwine, and the caste/class nexus provides a major key to assess the role of caste in contemporary India.

The literature shows that the intertwining of class and caste is observed at two levels: the ideological use of caste to control the level of class conflicts and to pursue the interests of the hegemonic classes; and the creation of caste-based institutional constructions to support specific classes – or segments of classes – in becoming hegemonic.

On the one side, caste prevents the formation of class-consciousness. It substitutes caste consciousness for class-consciousness, leading the exploited classes to absorb – and become committed to – values and interests of the dominating classes. Caste values and interests contrast with class values and interests: if the latter are tools to mobilise the exploited classes against the exploiting classes, enhancing class conflicts, the former prevent class conflicts. On the other side, caste creates non-class institutions – caste associations and caste-based associations – that represent and organise particularistic interests vested in caste identity, so breaking the unity of the exploited classes by dividing them according to their caste (Bhambhri, 2005). This action assists in constraining class-consciousness, slowing down class unity.

Caste impacts on class also through the formation of new classes across the caste hierarchy. This process, that Sheth (1999: 2508) calls the ‘classisation of caste’, is shown in particular by the emergence of the new ‘middle class’ that is the outcome of inter-caste mobility and in-caste class differentiation (Béteille, 2007). The new middle class is a composite stratum that includes members of several castes who share lifestyles and the self-consciousness of belonging to the same class (Sheth, 1999: 2508-9; Varma, 1998).

While including several castes, the new middle class is rapidly acquiring a specific self-identity: members share interests and lifestyles with other members of the class rather than with individuals of the same caste, becoming progressively more distant from the rituals specific to their caste (Sheth, 1999). It is then a class in the making, its cement being economic and political interests and lifestyles (Harriss-White, 2003).

The new class formation does not require the dissolution of individual caste identities. Caste still provides the cultural background of social and political life: ‘identity politics

[i.e. caste politics] has come to prevail over class politics' (Béteille, 2007: 951), while caste-based associations and parties represent the main instrument to organise and represent interests. Then, vested interests are expressed in terms of caste identity and, at the same time, caste provides the organisational structure to participate in the political arena and to seek favour from the central and local state.

#### *A Gramscian conceptualisation of caste*

The post-Mandal change shows that caste is at the same time an *ideology* and an *institution*. As a system of values and beliefs, caste is part of the mental processes that shape human agency, influencing social intercourse. As an institution – when it transforms from ideas into social norms – caste defines widely accepted patterns of civil society organisation, constructing and legitimising social differences. Relying on these roles, it continues to be a major organising principle of India's society.

Both as an ideology and as an institution, caste is part of the superstructure and is involved in a double interplay with structure: it influences production relations and production forces, and is influenced by them. As such, it is a historical construction, which evolves according to the change in social production relations.

As an institution, caste has undergone a cumulative process of change in which its nature and its role have adapted. The outcome is a form of civil society's organisation in which caste provides a major vehicle for the representation and organisation of particularistic (class and non-class) interests emerging in the economy and polity. Also as an ideology, caste has undergone a deep change since Independence, progressively weakening its religious character to gain instead a political connotation.

Caste is much more than a 'false consciousness' that undermines the unity of the working classes. It is a major force in civil society's organisation in which ideology 'materialises'. Reading it through Gramsci's theory of hegemony, this two-fold nature corresponds to a two-fold role: as ideology, caste ensures that the intellectual and moral leadership of the elites is 'spontaneously' accepted through shared values and ideas, supporting the hegemony of the dominant classes over the subaltern ones with the use of caste idioms and symbols; as civil society, caste produces a network of associations in which subaltern and dominant classes enter 'voluntarily', and in which the necessary consensus over hegemony is negotiated. Both the ideology and the civil society that the ideology produces are the outcome of social production relations. While ideology ensures that dominant classes also have moral and intellectual leadership over subaltern classes, this dominance is rooted in the structure of the economy: jointly, caste and production relations constitute the historical bloc which is specific in this phase of India's capitalist development.

#### **4. Caste and production relations in Arni's civil society**

Arni is a market town in a semiarid rice-growing district in northern Tamil Nadu (South India) in which the Green Revolution was introduced at the end of the 1960s. After the Green Revolution, the town has experienced a major process of rural industrialisation, which has transformed the town into the centre of an agro-industrial economy, dominated by small- and medium-size firms specialised in silk production and in the manufacturing and trade of agricultural products, with an increasing endowment of

services. This process has been accompanied by the emergence of new classes and new patterns in civil society's organisation in which institutions and ideologies rooted in India's culture deeply intertwine with capitalist production relations and the economy presents the main features of informalisation (Basile, 2013).

### *The survey*

My aim with the survey on Arni's civil society was: i) to explore the pattern of social organisation and ii) to assess its economic impact. The survey was based on a questionnaire submitted to all the associations existing in the town in the late 1990s in order to explore their nature and function.<sup>10</sup> Consistently with Gramsci's theory of hegemony, civil society was taken as the sphere in which class and non-class interests are expressed and represented, exerting an influence on production relations and being influenced by them. The survey dealt with the nature and working of associations. The aim was two-fold: i) to understand whether or not the institutions were playing a regulatory function; and ii) to assess the degree of voluntariness of membership in order to establish to what extent social interplay was producing a form of corporatist civil society.

To translate the Gramscian framework in empirical terms, the economic process was deconstructed to single out the vital points at which the impact of civil society's organisation is significant. Three phases were identified in the production process: the purchase of the means of production and labour power, the organisation of production, and the realisation process. Then, the analysis focused on four categories of relationships in which conflicting interests emerge and social regulation is necessary: economy/state; capital/labour; within capital; economy/society.

Detailed information was collected on: i) the nature of associations (aim, criterion for membership, action); ii) presence and role of the state in the economy; iii) market structure and intersectoral relations; vi) the social embeddedness of capital accumulation with specific reference to family, religion and caste.

Altogether, I interviewed: i) 32 business and professional associations, with an estimated coverage of approximately 2,000 people; ii) 23 cultural and religious associations, of which 15 are caste associations. This category also includes a consumer association and 7 philanthropic associations, and covers more than 35,000 people; iii) 11 unions, covering less than 2,000 people. The total number of people indirectly covered by this set of associations is of the order of 40-45,000, but this is a rough estimate, due to double-counting in organisations of caste and of trade.

### *Arni's civil society*

Tables 1 and 2 introduce Arni's civil society distinguishing associations on the basis of their activity. Table 1 confirms the existence in Arni of a comprehensive associational order which provides interesting information on the structure of the economy. Civil society includes associations of individuals involved in the production of goods (in particular silk and rice) and services (both for persons and for production). It also stresses the presence of the state in Arni's economy, as suggested by 5 unions of public sector workers. Table 2 complements the information showing the significant presence

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<sup>10</sup> A detailed information on the survey is found in Basile (2013: Ch. 8).

of caste associations and of a heterogeneous group of associations – ‘welfare’ associations – whose aims are oriented to the entire town’s corporate interests, rather than to individual or group interests.

Once the organisation of Arni’s civil society has been introduced, the next step is to explore its nature and function, focusing on the forms of individual participation in civil society and on the impact of the associational order on economic performance. To this aim, the associations are first classified in relation to the ‘voluntariness’ of participation and to their impact on growth and stability; then, the interviews are analysed focusing on the economic relations in which conflicting interests emerge and social regulation is necessary (Tables 3 and 4).

Four degrees of voluntariness of membership have been defined:

1. Voluntary membership: when at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: i) the number of participants is ‘small’ in comparison to the potential members; ii) non-membership excludes a person only from the association’s activity; iii) other similar associations exist.
2. Exclusive but voluntary membership: when all the following conditions are satisfied: i) not all the potential members are actual members; ii) other similar associations do not exist; iii) non-membership ‘excludes’ a person only from one specific segment of the relevant market or from some benefit.
3. Quasi-voluntary membership by profession: membership is formally voluntary but the status of non-member excludes them from the profession. It is identified by: i) the absence of other similar associations; and ii) membership spread to all the individuals in the profession.
4. Quasi-voluntary membership by birth: this category obviously includes caste associations, but also the professional associations that group individuals from a specific caste.

The associations are also classified on the basis of two complementary criteria: i) their influence on social stability and ii) their influence on economic growth. This exercise is supported by the information coming from the interviews in which each association is asked to provide details on its involvement in the economic process. Then, for each association, the influence on social stability has been established by assessing its impact on the relations (and conflicts) between capital and labour, capital and state, labour and state, within capital, and economy and society. Similarly, the influence on economic growth has been established on the basis of the impact on the access to the means of production, on the organisation of the production process and on the disposal/marketing of output.

The information coming from the previous two classifications is presented in a compact form in Table 5. The evidence provided by the interviews is commented below.

### *State and economy*

The survey shows the presence of the state in Arni’s economy at four main levels. First, the state manages activities that are relevant for the economy and society: it directly provides and regulates public services, such as banks and post-office, hospitals and schools, and supplies goods and infrastructural services, such as food and electricity.

Moreover, it participates in the building of the economic infrastructure of the town, representing a major component of effective demand. This aspect clearly emerges from the vast majority of reports from business associations, which emphasise the importance of orders from public sector institutions for items such as books, uniforms, building materials, housing etc.

Second, the state formally defines the regulative framework of certain aspects of 'informal' economic life. For example it concedes licences to trade and to use public land, and collects fiscal revenue and levies, albeit in a fashion challenged by avoidance and evasion. Third, private citizens and members of the organisations frequently enter into conflicting or collusive contact with the police.

Fourth, the major concern of the associations is to find a way to direct their relations with the public authorities along mutually satisfactory lines. Despite the fact that the declared aim of the associations might be to promote the 'welfare' or the 'interest' of the members, their actual aim is to limit the intrusiveness of the state in their field and to lobby for the interest of the associations. In other terms, their function is to enter the political exchange with the state – i.e. to bargain over state actions and state influence on the economy – in order to define the terms of the relationships between state/economy/society. Corruption is a central ingredient of this political exchange.

#### *Economic interests*

The core activities of the town are regulated by a strict associational order. So, the Paddy and Rice Mills' Association dominates the rice sector by regulating the relationships among members as far as problems with labour and weights are concerned. Employer/employee relations are also managed within the rice firms and are controlled directly by the owners/entrepreneurs. This is also the case of the Silk Twisters' Association which participates in the regulation of the silk sector informing members about cases of misbehaviour of workers in order to organise collective punishment. By contrast, the major aim of the Tamil Nadu Gold and Silver Merchants' Federation is the internal control of the profession. This takes the form of quasi-voluntary membership: a necessary condition to enter the profession is to be a member, while members are more or less obliged to accept the formal and informal rules decided by the association.

The associational order also impacts on the phases of the production process. In relation to the access to factors of production, there are associations that dominate the private credit system (i.e. the Association of Pawnbrokers) and regulate the link between official and unofficial sources of financing. Some associations keep strong control over information about the channels to obtain loans from private sources, while in other cases – as for instance the Grocery Merchants Association – credit systems are organised to allow members to 'purchase commodities ... without interest'. Also the Tamil Nadu Building Workers Sangam 'in some cases gives interest-free loans' to members.

Associations also play a major role for education, training and enrolment of workers. This is particularly evident in the case of caste associations when they organise individuals working in the same profession, such as the Barbers' Association and the Weavers' Association, but it is also common for other business associations that examine the family background of workers and their caste at the moment of enrolment. Caste associations – for instance The Tamil Nadu Karneegar Sangam – also provide the

members ‘counselling for getting education’, while other associations – for instance the Arni Washermen’s Union (a caste-based association) – have the main aim to ‘see that washermen are employed on a regular basis’.

Finally, the organisational structure defines the working times for each category of workers, and influences prices and wages. For instance, the Tamil Nadu Association of Shaving Saloons and the Arni Electricians’ Sangam fix the rate for the services provided by the members. Similarly, the Arni Silk Merchants Association controls the biennial revision of weavers’ wages and exerts a pressure ‘on government to provide insurance cover to weavers’. Likewise, the Tiruvannamalai District Handloom Silk Designer Association reports that – before the starting of the association – design workers were getting unsatisfactory remuneration, a problem that the association has solved. By contrast, the Grocery Merchants Association, while not setting the prices, collects the information on the basis of which prices are determined, while the Arni Area Car and Van Drivers Welfare Association ensures that the members are regularly paid their wages. Finally, the powerful Paddy and Rice Merchants Association, denouncing the widespread risk of corruption and fraud, emphasises the necessity to define a common policy and practice for members in relation to the measures to be used in transactions.

Associations are usually in charge of the representation of members’ interests. Yet, their regulatory function clearly emerges from the interviews. This is the case of the Association for the Progress of Tailors that i) issues identity cards to regulate the participation of members, ii) divides ‘the work (from public orders) among the members’ in order ‘to benefit many families economically’, iii) provides assistance in order to get credit, and iv) ensures the members protection in case of conflicts with the employers (‘many tailors who are not members of the Association are removed with impunity by employers’). Similar cases include that of the Valumpuri Vinayakar Rickshaw Pullers Association, that has the main aim of defining an ‘informal code of conduct’ for members, and of the Arni Auto Owners and Drivers Association that sets the prices for the services provided by members and, at the same time, protects members in case of accidents and disputes. Another form of regulatory role is shown in the case of the Raw Silk Twisters Association that informs ‘all factories’ about workers who can create problems.

The regulatory role is also stressed by the Porters’ Association (a caste-based association) which protects members’ interests in the labour market. Similarly, the Soda Factory Association argues that ‘a new shop has to be started only with the consent of the Association which would create otherwise problems for the person starting it’. Also the Tamil Nadu Gold and Silver Jewellery Merchants Federation regulates the activity, warning its members about the risk of purchasing stolen jewels, while the Arni Pawnbrokers Association has the aim to ensure that members are ‘licence holders’. Another major example of the regulatory function is provided by the Chamber of Commerce, which explicitly aims at controlling competition in order to keep prices and profits at a reasonable level for Arni’s business economy as a whole.

The role of labour unions is mainly confined to public sector. Four main associations ‘protect’ the interests of public workers. This is the case, in particular, of the National Federation of Postal Employees which has the aim to ‘fight against the punishment imposed by the superior authorities’ and for ‘pay rise’. It also exerts a pressure to for ‘the implementation of all the benefits and privileges given by the government’. The

central and local state is also the counterpart of the other three public sector unions – Sanitary Workers Sangam, Nursery School Sangam, and School Teachers Federation – which share the common aim to protect the workers and their sectors of activity from corruption and interference of state officials.

In addition to these, the Dr. Ambedkar Transport Workers' Union should also be mentioned as a particular type of trade union that groups mainly (but not only) Scheduled Castes (SCs) workers who are employed by the Transport Service (government-owned). The aim of this union is to support the rights of SCs transport workers against any kind of negative discrimination, in particular when a worker is considered 'undersirable' and there is the risk of 'dismission'. Finally, there is the Electricity Board Union which has among its aims, to ensure 'the security for workers and for society', to 'influence policy formation regarding wages', and to 'advise the government on policy'.

### *Economy and society*

Hindus, Jains, Christians, Muslims all live together in the town and participate in civil society associations. This applies in particular (but not only) to business and professional associations (other than those that are caste-based) that, by claiming to be 'open' to members from all castes, Muslims and Christians, assert a secular pluralistic identity. There are cases of important associations in which Muslim individuals occupy the top positions. This happens in the case of leading economic associations, such as the Arni Chamber of Commerce, the Jewellery Association and the Clothing Merchants' association.

Yet caste representation in formal caste associations is strong. The representation of SCs (about 15 percent of Arni's population, the majority of whom are employed in rice mills and public health/sanitation services) is not entrusted to one caste association, but is segmented into a number of small business and professional associations, unions, and political parties. These forms of 'organisational' representation have two major aspects in common: they lobby to defend their members politically and economically, and they bargain with the state for the implementation of the Reservation Policy, i.e. for the positive discrimination in terms of employment opportunities and other benefits.

Small business associations aim to keep under control the internal level of conflicts, providing a sort of behavioural code that guides members. As reported in interview, the Arni Town Fruit Merchants' Sangam, in which more than 90 percent of the members are SCs, has been formed in order to protect members from the police. Also the Rickshaw Pulling Association shares the aim to 'protect members from the harassment by the police'; yet, it also lobbies in order to ensure that the Municipality gives 'legal recognition to the rickshaw stand' and defines a behaviour code for community members who 'should not work when under the influence of drugs, not indulge in gambling, not speak to customers'. The Sanitary Workers' Sangam – a scheduled-caste-based trade union – declares the aim of protecting members from government's 'scant regard to views of workers' and of monitoring the organisation of work in order to avoid sexual discrimination.

This double level of action – external, in relation to the state and other castes, and internal, directed to the self-regulation of castes – is also to be found in the organisations that represent the interests of Most Backward Castes (MBCs): all together four registered commodity associations, four unregistered groups, four caste

associations and a caste-based group, the Pattali Makkal Katchi, recently transformed into a political party. As far as the professional associations are concerned (in particular Barbers' and Washermen's), the self-regulatory role consists in defining the relevant prices and the working conditions, while the main issue involves lobbying to obtain SC status (and positive discrimination).

This is also the case of the Tamil Nadu Association of Shaving Saloons – grouping individuals from the Tamil Barber Caste – which has the main aim of 'fixing the rates (for labour) for each type of facility provided'. Moreover, the Association also 'takes up the cases [of members] and represents [them] to the government'. Similarly, the Arni Washermen's Union has the declared aim of lobbying for the MBC status, while, at the same time, it bargains with the local government to ensure that washermen 'are appointed on a regular basis [as staff] in the hospital', while the Arni Town Vanniar Association declares the broader aim of lobbying to get from the government 'subsidies for agricultural inputs, higher prices for agricultural products, and reduction in price for the essential commodities'.

The Backwards Castes (BCs) constitute a most heterogeneous category, in which the core of Arni business (silk and gold) is included together with unskilled workers who live in poverty. In this caste category, in which the bulk of Arni's capital is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, we observe at work contradictory processes, such as the imitation of life styles and food consumption patterns of the Forward Castes (FCs), and the claiming for the MBC status in order to obtain economic advantages from the state.

The interviews report several cases of caste associations lobbying for MBC status. Thus, while the Naidu Association of Arni unites individuals from the Naidu community with the general aim 'to strive towards the security of members', it includes among its actions also placing pressure on the government to 'reclassify the community from present BC status to the MBC category (so that they can enjoy more specific reservation quotas)'. A similar action is also reported by the Tamil Nadu Karneegar Sangam, the Tiruvannamalai District Vanniar Sangam, the Yadavas Sangam, and the Arni Kannada Veera Saiva Jainkeekar Sangam.

By contrast other examples exist – such as that of the Tamil Nadu Jewel Workers Central Sangam (Arni Branch), which organises goldsmiths – in which the activity is mainly aimed at the internal regulation of businesses and the protection of members in trouble with the police; while the Arni Town Segunthar Sangam mainly works on social welfare in order to 'improve the conditions of the community' providing 'free tuition to children' and 'aid to poor families'.

The aim of protecting the community in its relations with the local and central governments and to regulate internal relations is also observed in the case of FC civil society. Here, again, the claiming of BC status is a common practice in the political exchange with local and central authorities and is an ideologically unifying aspiration for the various communities.

Caste associations exhibit two fields of action: an internal field, with the aim of self-regulation, and an external field, with the aim of lobbying and bargaining with the state to obtain advantages. So, the Tamil Nadu Brahmin's Sangam (Arni Branch) – which organises all Brahmin communities in the town – denounces the widespread feeling of 'depression and oppression' of its members due to the increasing difficulty in getting



government employment, as a consequence of the Reservation Policy; this situation contrasts with the high level of education of the community in which more than 60 percent of the members reach the level of secondary school and about 30 percent reach the level of college education. A similar situation is denounced by the Tamil Nadu Archaka's Welfare Sangam (grouping Gurukkals – a sub-Brahmin caste) that complains about the fact that the community is not given 'due respect' by government.

From the field material it appears that caste associations perform two main roles. First, they regulate the internal relationships in two major ways: by defining a widely accepted behavioural code and by providing several forms of social support for the weakest members. Since caste associations are in some cases also occupation groups, this internal self-regulation easily becomes a major organising factor for the economy with a direct influence on capital/labour relationships, regulating the working conditions. Second, caste associations explicitly involve political exchanges with the state for the intermediation of particularistic interests. The most common attempt takes the form of lobbying to obtain a lower caste status – a behaviour which is broadly found among all BC and FC associations. Other forms of political bargaining and negotiations range from requesting recognition of the public importance of specific activities to seeking protection from police harassment, and to the request of Brahmins for an improved access to public employment and more 'respectful' treatment by the state.

'Welfare' associations complete Arni's associational order. These associations, whose spheres of action range from philanthropy to lobbying for the town's infrastructure, are significant because they contain and enhance the cross-caste idea of the town's 'unity'. Elite associations such as the Rotary Club, the Lions Club (together with its women's wing), and the Inner Wheel Club of Arni (another women's association), which are in principle open to all social classes components, actually group the well-off members of the town and legitimate the role of the elites, emphasising the importance of philanthropy. These associations are involved in several forms of 'social service organisations' in the fields of health, education, and charity. They assist in the central and local government's social campaigns and organise free distributions of food, books, clothes and medicines. In their several activities they work in strict collaboration with public institutions, such as hospitals and schools.

#### *Production relations in Arni's civil society*

We can conclude our analysis observing that the survey has shown the existence in Arni's civil society of an associational order with a significant impact on the economy. The associations create the social environment for accumulation regulating individual and group interactions at two major complementary levels: first, within the associational framework (inside each association and between associations) and, second, between associations and the state.

The state is a central component of Arni's collective life. The actual aim of the associations is to enter into political relationships with the state in order to negotiate particularistic interests. At the same time, the field evidence shows that to belong to an association is a necessary condition to enter into political relationships with the state. Moreover, due to its role in providing infrastructure and its contribution to effective demand in the region, the influence of the state on Arni's economy – in particular on accumulation – is still high. This explains bargaining and corruption in the multifarious attempts to privatise the benefits deriving directly or indirectly from the state.

Arni's associational order reflects social production relations. Capital and labour are represented in a variety of forms. Yet, to identify these forms might be a challenging task because Arni, like India at large, has a complex socio-economic structure in which caste is intertwined with class. In relation to labour, the social structure operates at two levels. First, labour is aggregated in several caste associations, mainly in the SC and in MBC categories. Second, some 'professional' and 'business' associations (i.e. petty trade and small activities' associations) organise individuals who, while formally 'independent' workers, lack economic autonomy and depend on informal credit market and on merchants for the provision of inputs, and are often wage labour in disguise. Such associations should be interpreted as representing 'labour' rather than 'capital'.

Non-class associations, such as caste and petty business associations, also have an ideological role as they concur in undermining the class-consciousness of the lower strata of Arni's society. The political-economic organisation of wage-labour and other types of 'dependent' labour on the basis of non-class criteria substitutes for the formal representation of workers in trade unions.

Another feature of Arni's social structure is found in the role of 'big' business associations in the internal management of industrial relations. 'Big' business associations are overt capital associations which directly control intra-firm labour/capital relations defining behavioural codes widely recognised by members, by virtue of a low degree of voluntariness of membership. Moreover, 'big' business associations are involved in the bargaining with the state in fields that are relevant for the sector as a whole, including working conditions. This role helps explaining the absence of unions in the private sector, because employers represent the interests of the employees in any context they believe to be relevant.

So there is an asymmetry between the representation of labour and capital that is a major trait of Arni's associational order. While employers are widely organised by means of interest groups that shape inter-firm relations, control intra-firm relations, and bargain over the terms of state intervention, employees' organisations are weak and lack a collective dimension. This may explain why unions are missing, while the working class interests often blend with other social components, as in the cases of cultural and religious associations, or are aggregated on the basis of features other than social production relations, as in the case of caste associations. The only cases of collective workers' organisations in the contemporary meaning of the term are to be found in the trade unions of public sector workers.

## **5. A case of societal corporatism**

The survey of Arni's civil society has provided a strong evidence of an associational order that is built on economic and non-economic associations governing the production process in all phases as representatives of capital and labour's interests. It has also shown that the state is a central institution of 'governance' and that the open aim of Arni's associations is to bargain with the state in order to obtain advantages for their members. In this sense, Arni's associations appear to be *intermediaries* – and not only *representatives* – of class interests.

Anri's associational order is biased toward capital. The representation of capital is strong – owing to the joint action of 'big' business associations and locally dominant

caste associations. By contrast, there is a systematic under-representation of labour, owing to the lack of labour associations together with the absorption of the (disguised) labour force under non-economic and non-class associations. This bias against labour implies that decisions about recruitment of workers and about working conditions are in the hands of capital. The main responsibility for the low level of representation of workers in trade unions is due to the way caste associations and caste ideology neutralise class.

The survey evidence is largely consistent with the Gramscian proposition about the role of the organised civil society in supporting capital's hegemony. Arni's associations provide the cross-class institutional structure in which capital's hegemony is negotiated. Caste associations stand out for their two-fold role: as regulating institutions for economic behaviour inside each caste group and as intermediaries in the political relationship with the state.

Arni's organised civil society shows features that are typical of societal corporatism: i) the associational order emerges under the pressure of social groups; ii) it is composed of interest associations – i.e. associations of individuals sharing social and economic interests; iii) interest associations are involved in several types of socio-economic relations in each phase of the production process; and iv) the underlying function of the associational order is to regulate social relationships and to create the conditions for economic growth. Associations are at the same time *representatives* and *intermediaries* of particularistic interests, and perform their regulatory role in three major ways: by helping to determine members' interests; by negotiating agreements on members' behalf; and by enforcing such agreements to their members.

Arni's corporatist regime is tripartite, involving state, capital and labour. Yet, the standard tripartite logic of political exchange is adapted to Arni's social structure and informal economy, in which – due to the co-existence of several forms of stratification – capital and labour are jointly represented and regulated by class and non-class associations. Caste is a major pillar of Arni's corporatism, playing a two-fold role as ideology and as institution. Through caste, social constraints are transferred to the economy, determining the overlap between economy and society that is specific to corporatism.

The primary aims of Arni's associations are to enter into political exchange with the state and to provide the institutional framework for social interaction. Acting as representatives, intermediaries of members' interests and regulators, associations share behavioural codes. Membership is the necessary condition to participate in political relationships, while – in particular in cases such as 'big' business associations – non-participation implies exclusion from political exchange and often also from entry into economic activity. Accordingly, the degree of voluntariness of participation in interest associations in Arni is low and decreasing as the importance of economic interests increases.

The by-product of Arni's societal corporatism is social stability that is obtained by controlling the level of conflicts. The field material reveals a common tendency to deny the relevance, or even the existence, of both capital/labour conflicts and inter-firm conflicts. The absence of inter-firm conflicts appears to be the result of the very existence and action of (trade and business) associations, and suggests that to limit inter-firm conflicts is their social function and that membership means accepting this. One possible implication is that the absence of inter-firm conflicts should be seen as an

indicator of the efficacy of the associations in performing their function.

The situation is much more complex in the case of capital/labour conflicts. The survey shows that there is a major asymmetry in the representation of labour and capital, as labour is under-represented, while the larger part of the membership and the activity of business associations overtly represents capital. This asymmetry goes together with another important asymmetry that refers to the management of capital/labour relations. From the survey we understand that capital/labour relations are usually managed within individual firms and are directly controlled by employers. Associations of capitalists are in charge of all decisions concerning the enrolment of workers and working conditions. They also control the 'misbehaviour' of workers and the collective punishment of individual actions against the rules.

Caste ideology is functional to the corporatist project. Paradoxically, by undermining class-consciousness and by fracturing the unity of the working class, caste enhances social cohesion. Moreover, it provides the ideological instruments which limit the perception of the quasi-compulsory nature of the associational order, ensuring a 'voluntary' consensus in favour of the hegemony of the dominant classes, and promoting the 'voluntary' participation of subaltern classes in organised civil society.

Arni's corporatism is meant to promote economic growth. The survey shows that the associational order enhances economic growth in three major ways. First, social stability is in itself a factor of growth as it creates a favourable environment for decision-making. This applies to all phases of the production process, from access to inputs and enrolment and training of workers, to access to output market, to the setting of output prices, and to inter-firm relations. Second, the associational order regulates the relations between Arni's economy and the state. The state is an important source of demand and associations ensure that state orders are distributed among producers without conflicts. Third, the regulation of the economy reduces risk and enhances investment.

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Table 1 - Associations in Arni by sphere of action (economic activities)

<b>Production of goods</b>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
<b>Rice</b>						
ARNI TALUK RICE MILL OWNERS' ASSN		1		1980		
PADDY AND RICE MERCHANTS ASSN	1			1970		147
<b>Silk</b>						
THE ARNI SILK MERCHANTS ASSN	1				4000	40,000
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT HANDLOOM SILK DESIGNERS ASSN	1			1996	65	
SILK TWISTERS ASSN	1			1972		3000
<b>Gold</b>						
THE TAMILNADU JEWEL WORKERS CENTRAL SANGAM	1		state	1963	450	
TAMILNADU GOLD & SILVER MERCHANTS FEDERATION, CHENNAI	1			1960		50
<b>Buildings</b>						
THE TAMILNADU BUILDING WORKERS SANGAM, ARNI	1		local	1974	500	
ARNI ELECTRICIANS' SANGAM	1		local	1978	120	
ARNI BRICK MAKERS ASSN	1		local			
QUARRY WORKERS	1					3
CEMENT DEALERS		1				10
ELECTRICITY BOARD UNION—CITU	1		nation	1970	230	400
<b>Others</b>						
FERTILISERS AND PESTICIDES		1				13
SODA FACTORY ASSN	1			1980	100	
BAKERIES		1				13
ARNI SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES ASSN	1			1980	24	
<b>Public sector unions</b>						
ARNI BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF POSTAL EMPLOYEES	1		nation	1919	47	62
SANITARY WORKERS' SANGAM, ARNI	1		local	1981	155	
NURSERY SCHOOLS		1				
ARNI ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS FEDERATION	1			1957	60	
<b>Private traditional services</b>						
<b>Personal services</b>						
THE TAMIL NADU ASSN OF SHAVING SALOONS	1		local	1956	100	100
THE ARNI WASHERMANS' (DHABI) UNION	1					
THE ASSN FOR THE PROGRESS OF TAILORS	1		state	1995	300	2500
TEA STALL		1			300	
LOTTERY TICKETS		1				40
<b>Consumer goods</b>						
THE GROCERY MERCHANTS ASSN OF ARNI	1			1972	50	
ARNI TOWN FRUITS MERCHANTS ASSN	1		local	1982	71	
THE ARNI TOWN FLOWERS MERCHANT SANGAM	1		state	1996	40	
ARNI GREENGROCERS ASSN (GANDHI MARKET), ARNI	1		local	1967	86	86
VINAYAKA TEXTILES		1				20

Table 1 (cont.):

<b>Production of goods</b>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
<b>Transport</b>						
THE VALAMPURI VINAYAKAR RICKSHAWS PULLERS' ASSN	1		state	1997	15	
THE ARNI AUTO OWNERS AND DRIVERS WELFARE UNION	1			1993	96	
THE ARNI LORRY OWNERS ASSN	1		nation	1990	150	
DR.AMBEDKAR TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION, ARNI	1		state	1989	75	
ARINGAR ARNI BULLOCK—CART DRIVERS' SANGAM	1		local	1997	120	
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT BUS OWNERS; ASSN	1		local	1989	110	
ARNI AREA CAR AND VAN DRIVERS' WELFARE ASSN	1			1997	90	
TWO WHEELERS (MOPEDS ETC.) SPARE PARTS—SALES ASSN		1				4
PEDDAL BICYCLE DEALERS (MRA CYCLE MART), ARNI		1				6
<b>Finance</b>						
ARNI PAWNBROKERS ASSN	1				100	170
<b>Others</b>						
THE ARNI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	1			1989	103	
THE ADVOCATES BAR ASSN	1		local	1961	30	30
PORTERS ASSN	1				63	
TURNING WORKS (LATHE "PATTARIAS")	1					
PHARMACISTS AND DRUGGIST ASSN	1			1987	22	22
TWO WHEELERS REPAIR SHOPS		1				
<b>New activities</b>						
<b>Communication</b>						
ASSN OF TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS	1			1992	250	800
TELEPHONE BOOTHS		1				15
PROFESSIONAL COURIERS		1				6
<b>Printing</b>						
TYPEWRITING (COMMERCIAL EDUCATION) INSTITUTES		1				14
XEROX		1				18
PRINTING PRESS		1				16
<b>Cinema and television</b>						
THE ARNI VIDEO CASSTTE LIBRARY ASSN	1			1992	2	
THE CINEMA THEATRE OWNERS ASSN	1		local	1988	4	
CABLE TV OPERATORS		1				
<b>Electronics</b>						
COMPUTER STUDIES		1				5
(GEETHA) ELECTRONICS AND HOME APPLIANCES		1				20
<b>Finance</b>						
FINANCE COMPANIES						30
BANKS						3

Legenda: (a) Registered association; (b) Informal group; (c) Type of network;  
(d) Foundation year; (e) No of members of the association; (f) No of potential members.



Table 2 - Association in Arni by sphere of action (non-economic activities)

<b>Caste associations</b>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
SAURASHTRA PODHU SABHA	1		1968		5000
THE SAURASHTRA WOMAN'S ASSOCIATION, ARNI	1		1977	22	
THE NAIDU ASSN OF ARNI	1		1982		1000
THE TAMIL NADU KARNEEGAR SANGAM, ARNI	1	state			
THE ARNI TOWN VANNIARS ASSN	1		1983	7000	
THE ARNI TULUVA VELALAR SANGAM	1	local	1953	100	14,000
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT VAANIAR SANGAM	1		1992	150	
THE TAMILNADU BRAHMINS SANGAM ("TAMBRAS")—ARNI BRANCH	1		1995	200	
THE TAMILNADU ARCHAKAS WELFARE SANGAM	1	local	1980	65	95
TAMIL SAIVA CHETTIAR	1				
THE ARNI KANNADA VEERA SAIVA JAINEEKAR SANGAM	1	state	1927	300	
THE ARNI TOWN SENGUNTHAR SANGAM	1	local	1983	150	
YAADAVAS	1				2500
AHAMUDAIYA MUDALIARS SANGAM	1			15,000	
<b>Religious and political associations</b>					
THE INDIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY	1	national	1994	25	
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA—MARXIST	1	national	1964	200	
MUSLIMS	1				3000
ROMAN CATHOLICS	1				800
PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS	1				600
JAINS	1				1000
<b>Welfare associations</b>					
THE INNER WHEEL CLUB OF ARNI	1	intern	1995	22	
THE LIONS CLUB OF ARNI	1		1971	75	
THE ROTARY CLUB OF ARNI	1		1985	41	
ALL PENSIONERS ASSN	1		1984	500	
THE ARNI TOWN WELFARE COMMITTEE	1		1992	40	
THE LIONESSE CLUB	1		1977	85	

Legenda: (a) Registered association; (b) Type of network; (c) Foundation year; (d) No of members of the association; (e) No of potential members.

Table 3 - Associations and informal groups in Arni by membership and by influence on phases of production and typologies of socio-economic relation (economic activities)

<b>Production of goods</b>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(l)	(m)	(n)
<b>Rice</b>												
ARNI TALUK RICE MILL OWNERS' ASSN	1				1			1			1	
PADDY AND RICE MERCHANTS ASSN			1				1	1		1		
<b>Silk</b>												
THE ARNI SILK MERCHANTS ASSN	1											1
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT HANDLOOM SILK DESIGNERS ASSN	1							1				
SILK TWISTERS ASSN			1			1	1	1		1		
<b>Gold</b>												
THE TAMILNADU JEWEL WORKERS CENTRAL SANGAM			1		1	1		1	1		1	
TAMILNADU GOLD & SILVER MERCHANTS FEDERATION, CHENNAI			1				1	1		1		
<b>Buildings</b>												
THE TAMILNADU BUILDING WORKERS SANGAM, ARNI			1					1	1		1	
ARNI ELECTRICIANS' SANGAM		1			1	1	1		1	1	1	
ARNI BRICK MAKERS ASSN			1									
QUARRY WORKERS			1									
CEMENT DEALERS												
ELECTRICITY BOARD UNION—CITU	1							1	1			
<b>Others</b>												
FERTILISERS AND PESTICIDES												
SODA FACTORY ASSN			1	1	1	1		1		1		
BAKERIES												
ARNI SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES ASSN	1								1		1	
<b>Public sector unions</b>												
ARNI BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF POSTAL EMPLOYEES	1											
SANITARY WORKERS' SANGAM, ARNI			1					1		1		
NURSERY SCHOOLS												
ARNI ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS FEDERATION	1								1			
<b>Private traditional services</b>												
<b>Personal services</b>												
THE TAMIL NADU ASSN OF SHAVING SALOONS		1			1	1		1	1			1
THE ARNI WASHMANS' (DHOBI) UNION		1					1		1	1		
THE ASSN FOR THE PROGRESS OF TAILORS	1						1			1		
TEA STALL												
LOTTERY TICKETS												
<b>Consumer goods</b>												
THE GROCERY MERCHANTS ASSN OF ARNI		1			1			1	1			1
ARNI TOWN FRUITS MERCHANTS ASSN		1			1	1				1	1	
THE ARNI TOWN FLOWERS MERCHANT SANGAM			1			1		1			1	
ARNI GREENGROCERS ASSN (GANDHI MARKET), ARNI			1			1		1	1			
VINAYAKA TEXTILES												
<b>Transport</b>												
THE VALAMPURI VINAYAKAR RICKSHAWS PULLERS' ASSN		1			1			1	1			
THE ARNI AUTO OWNERS AND DRIVERS WELFARE UNION		1				1	1	1			1	
THE ARNI LORRY OWNERS ASSN	1				1	1		1	1	1	1	
DR.AMBEDKAR TRANSPORT WORKERS' UNION, ARNI	1					1		1		1		
ARINGAR ARNI BULLOCK—CART DRIVERS' SANGAM 226—235			1				1				1	
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT BUS OWNERS; ASSN		1						1	1			
ARNI AREA CAR AND VAN DRIVERS' WELFARE ASSN			1			1	1	1	1		1	
TWO WHEELERS (MOPEDS ETC.), SPARE PARTS—SALES ASSN												
PEDDAL BICYCLE DEALERS (MRA CYCLE MART), ARNI												

Table 3 (cont.)

<b>Production of goods</b>	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(l)	(m)	(n)
<b>Finance</b>												
ARNI PAWNBROKERS ASSN			1	1			1	1		1		
<b>Others</b>												
THE ARNI CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	1							1				
THE ADVOCATES BAR ASSN			1						1			
PORTERS ASSN			1				1		1			
TURNING WORKS (LATHE "PATTARIAS")			1				1	1	1			
PHARMACISTS AND DRUGGIST ASSN		1					1	1		1		
<b>New activities</b>												
<b>Communication</b>												
ASSN OF TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS	1						1					1
TELEPHONE BOOTHS												
PROFESSIONAL COURIERS												
<b>Printing</b>												
TYPEWRITING (COMMERCIAL EDUCATION) INSTITUTES												
XEROX												
PRINTING PRESS												
<b>Cinema and television</b>												
THE ARNI VIDEO CASSTTE LIBRARY ASSN	1						1					
THE CINEMA THEATRE OWNERS ASSN		1										1
CABLE TV OPERATORS		1										1
<b>Electronics</b>												
COMPUTER STUDIES												
(GEETHA) ELECTRONICS AND HOME APPLIANCES												
<b>Finance</b>												
FINANCE COMPANIES												
BANKS												

Legenda for Tables 3 and 4: (a) Voluntary association; (b) Voluntary exclusive association; (c) Quasi-voluntary professional association; (d) Quasi-voluntary membership by birth; (e) Factors; (f) Processes; (g) Products; (h) Capital-labour relations; (i) Capital-state relations; (l) Labour-state relations; (m) Inter-capital relations; (n) Non-economic relations.

Table 4 - Associations and informal groups in Arni by membership and by influence on phases of production and typologies of socio-economic relations (non-economic activities)

<b>Caste associations</b>	(a)	(d)	(c)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(l)	(m)	(n)
SAURASHTRA PODHU SABHA		1	1		1			1	1	1
THE SAURASHTRA WOMAN'S ASSOCIATION, ARNI		1								1
THE NAIDU ASSN OF ARNI		1						1		1
THE TAMIL NADU KARNEEGAR SANGAM, ARNI		1								1
THE ARNI TOWN VANNIARS ASSN		1								
THE ARNI TULUVA VELALAR SANGAM		1								1
THE TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT VAANIAR SANGAM		1							1	1
THE TAMILNADU BRAHMINS SANGAM ("TAMBRAS") - ARNI BRANCH		1								1
THE TAMILNADU ARCHAKAS WELFARE SANGAM		1	1							1
TAMIL SAIVA CHETTIAR		1								
THE ARNI KANNADA VEERA SAIVA JAINEEKAR SANGAM		1				1				1
THE ARNI TOWN SENGUNTHAR SANGAM		1								1
YAADAVAS		1								1
AHAMUDAIYA MUDALIARS SANGAM		1						1	1	1
<b>Religious and political associations</b>										
THE INDIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY		1								1
COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA—MARXIST		1			1				1	
MUSLIMS		1								
ROMAN CATHOLICS		1								
PROTESTANT CHRISTIANS		1								
JAINS			1							
<b>Welfare associations</b>										
THE INNER WHEEL CLUB OF ARNI		1								
THE LIONS CLUB OF ARNI		1								1
THE ROTARY CLUB OF ARNI		1						1		1
ALL PENSIONERS ASSN		1								1
THE ARNI TOWN WELFARE COMMITTEE		1								1
THE LIONESSE CLUB		1								1

Legenda: see Table 3.

Table 5 - Registered and unregistered associations in Arni by membership and by impact on social stability

	Number of schedules	Impact on social stability					social relations	Total*
		k-l relations	k-state relations	l-state relations	k-k relations			
Voluntary membership	21	5	6	4	5	9	29	
Excluding voluntary membership	12	7	7	2	4	2	22	
Quasi-voluntary membership by profession	17	1	3	3	2	15	24	
Quasi-voluntary membership by birth	16	1	2	2	2	15	22	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>97</b>	

*Legenda:* k = capital; l= labour.

\* Associations may impact on several aspects of social stability.